An Analysis of Secondary Sources from Hurricane Katrina

Hurricane Katrina was one of the most destructive natural disasters in recent history, killing thousands of victims and leaving the Gulf Coast region in shambles. The total damage amounted to many billions of dollars, and the Federal Government has scrambled to coordinate relief efforts in attempt to repair and rebuild what was lost. Amidst the destruction in the Gulf Coast region, however, a single question still stands: who can we blame for the damage caused by the Hurricane? This question has raised important issues and controversies about whether or not Bush's response to the Hurricane was adequate; but as the dust settles, all fingers still seem to point toward Bush. The poor communication, failure of initiative, and misinformed decisions during the hurricane relief effort were President Bush's responsibility, and his greatest failure. Immediately after the Hurricane struck, poor communication was the government's largest breakdown. On the night of the hurricane, an e-mail message from FEMA's public affairs staff was sent to the chief of staff of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, which said that conditions "are far more serious than media reports are currently reflecting. Finding extensive flooding and more stranded people than they had thought..."1 Chertoff then called the Whitehouse to update the Hurricane's damage, but the President seemed oblivious to the current information. Even until the next morning, President Bush stayed on vacation in Texas, feeling relieved that New Orleans had "dodged the bullet", as he later recalled.2 The President's delay to increase hurricane relief efforts left thousands of people stranded in trees and on rooftops for hours without adequate rescue efforts. These crucial hours escalated seniors' and hospitalized patients' fatalities, who could not withstand the deadly weather through the night. Other failures in communication added to the disorganization and fatalities during the hurricane. On the morning of August 28th, Hurricane Katrina was upgraded to a category four hurricane, and then several hours later Katrina was again upgraded to a category five hurricane. When New Orlean's Mayor Ray Nagin became aware of the increasing wind speeds, he ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city. He was notified too late, however, and left his citizens with twenty hours to evacuate the city, which was only half of the time that researchers had determined necessary for evacuation. Amidst the confusion, the leaders of the evacuation did not communicate efficiently with the local public transportation officials. One Amtrack spokesmen claimed that when Amtrack "offered the city the opportunity to take evacuees out of harm's way... the city declined."3 The train left New Orleans with no passengers immediately before the storm struck. Two weeks later, however, Mayor Nagin denied that this offer was ever made to him by any Amtrack official.4 These statements display the obvious communication malfunctions that prevented the government from getting victims out of harm's way. Other instances of underused resources were prevalent during the Hurricane Katrina relief effort. An eight hundred and forty-four foot ship designed to dispatch Marines in amphibious assaults, for example, sat offshore unused after the hurricane. Although this ship was scheduled to travel away from the Gulf Coast region, Hurricane Katrina's fierce tides and waves forced it to remain there until the hurricane passed. Immediately after the storm, Marines on the ship claimed that they thought the inland cities had not been badly damaged, and were for the most part unharmed by the hurricane. In truth, however, the cities were devastated, and the citizens there were in desperate need of aid. Onboard the ship were helicopters, doctors, hospital beds, food, and water. The ship could also make its own water - up to 100,000 gallons a day. These resources, however, were not utilized by the people in charge, which may have caused hundreds of victims to suffer who needed their aid. The ship would have also been able to provide up to twelve hundred of its sailors for onshore relief, but the people in charge never called for their assistance. The crew on board remembers seeing dead animals floating everywhere and wanting to go onshore to help the victims, but they were forced to stay aboard until they were called upon by the government.5