Moreover, the retailer was too “ambitious” in forecasting rebates in the first half of its 2014/2015 financial year and earlier years and they may have manipulated the figures to enhance income and meet targets (Kukreja and Gupta, 2016). It is acknowledged that there was a possibility for retail payments to be disputed later, and a refund or a new agreement entered into, but by then, the original payment has been taken as revenue (Kukreja and Gupta, 2016). Furthermore, those in charge took the risk which they clearly understand consequences for, but as previously mentioned, the risk of not reaching the targets seemed to be higher. Studies of compensation structure have generally found that director remuneration is an increasing function of company size, providing management with a direct incentive to focus on size growth, rather than growth in shareholder returns (Hill and Jones, 1992). It seems like directors who pushed to represent false financial report had their incentives to publish inaccurate results regardless of the effect on shareholders.
Another factor that closely effects with the necessity to comply with the corporate governance code is auditors. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) states that the companies must establish appropriate measures for risk management and internal control principles and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the company’s auditors. It has been identified that PwC has audited Tesco since 1983; therefore, the threat of familiarity was remarkably high after a relationship of thirty plus years (Kukreja and Gupta, 2016). …
